The word “reality” and the adjective “real” might be among the most widely used terms to describe the whole human experience of the world and the fundamental structure of the world, regardless of our perception of it. But is the pathway where we receive information, process it, and store it within what we know as “reality” the only path? If there are other pathways to receive and process information, could there be other realities?
The etymology of the word “real” or “reality” in the world’s most common languages of the world traces back to similar roots despite differences in language families. There seems to be few shared concepts humans use to represent “reality”. In Indian languages we find the Arabic derived (Asli) – signifying authenticity, naturalness and validity. In the northern part of the world where Indo-European languages are prevalent, “real” traces back to “thing”, while a broad range of languages “real” is represented as “true”.
In human mind then, reality spans as a conceptual domain from correctness and authenticity to material existence. The aspects of “authentic” and “correct” reflect our mental judgement of whether something align with the models we have in our brains. Meanwhile the “material thing” aspect refers to a physical representation of something.
In his book, A Thousand Brains[1], Jeff Hawkins explains how the neo-cortex represents objects by creating geometrical / spatial templates in neural units called (cortical columns). His theory builds on Vernon Mountcastle discoveries,[2] and it aligns with philosophical models like Daniel Dennett’s[3] multiple drafts model, and Marvin Minsky’s society of mind[4], particularly their concepts of distributed, rather than central, agents in the brain. John O’Keefe and his colleagues won the Nobel prize for their work on how cortical columns store other types of data such as concepts, relationships and timelines on grid/spatial encoding. Imagine a database with one datatype (some sort of sequences or geospatial datatypes), where you have to store strings, integers and dates only within that datatype rather than having specialized datatypes.
Cortical columns are 1-square-millimeter structures of neurons that represent one of the main neural structures in the neocortex. There are about 150 thousand of them. Cortical columns are evolutionary refinements of a similar structure in the old brain that helps animals with navigation. Over the last few million years, cortical columns have driven the development and growth of the neocortex.
Does reality, for us, represent what aligns with the models stored in our cortical columns making them appear “true”, “authentic”, or “correct” in line with the meanings of real and reality across languages?
If language shows how data is stored and processed, and if truth, to some extent, is spatial, tangible, and concrete—perceived through the neocortex’s representation of prior experience – thus, truth, as a language construct, is inherently limited to describe our full experience of the world. Our reality, then, is primarily a physical reality. But what about other pathways for sensing and representing the world?
Emotional reality
Pain and pleasure represent another dimension of human and animal experience, specifically for species with nervous systems similar to ours. Unlike physical objects, pain and pleasure have no dimensions or visual form, yet their impact can be more profound than that of the physical entities the neocortex primarily processes. physical reality is not entirely distinct from this, as it consists of sensory inputs collected from all parts of the body and processed through a mechanism that has been refined and expanded over time, forming the primary way the neocortex experiences the world.[5].
Pain and pleasure also shape the neocortex. They are more universally understandable than individually built spatial models. “Painful” and “pleasant” may be clearer than “wrong” and “correct”.
Before discussing the old brain and the neocortex, which we may encounter in scientific articles, I will first point out the simplest way to understand these two parts of the brain as explained in Jeff Hawkins’ book. The old brain makes up 30% of the brain’s mass and is connected to all sensory inputs from the body, as well as motor commands that control and direct body movements. Its components include the hippocampus, amygdala, and brainstem. The newer part, known as the neocortex, constitutes 70% of the brain and forms the visible white, convoluted outer layer. It consists of multiple layers of cells that perform similar functions.
Tracing their path from sensory inputs to the modern brain reveals advanced processes: insula handles emotional reactions like empathy and disgust, while the prefrontal cortex calculates consequences and aids problem-solving[6] (not necessarily tied only to the experience of pain). Just as we process visual and tactile data across old and new brain to create objects representation in the cortical columns, we process pain and pleasure non-spatially, yet they profoundly influence our perception. I call this emotional reality.
This does not mean that brain regions are strictly limited to pain related tasks or that our perception of pain has changed simply because we possess the neocortex. The experience of pain and pleasure functions just as it does in any other animal: fight and flight, for example. However, the reflections of pleasure and pain on the neocortex are similar across the species, leading to functions that may not have directly correspond to primitive pain responses in the old brain. Just as we mentally map timelines or administrative hierarchies as if they were a physical space using we grid/spatial devices like the cortical columns. Similarly, the effects of pain and pleasure on individuals—functioning like organism-level programming —can extend to calculations, thought patterns, and behaviors beyond their original primitive triggers. Jonathan Haidt provides an example of how basic amygdala responses to fear can influence seemingly complex processes, like voting [7].
While a table’s has geometrical shape, it is easily represented spatially in the brain. However, the model we construct for other people’s emotions—based on our perception of pleasure, pain, and all their degrees, complexities, and calculations—does not necessarily have to be processed in a physical manner. Instead, it represents an entirely separate level of reality perception. Theory of Mind relies partly on our estimations of others’ pain, based on our own[8]. From Theory of Mind and empathy to broader social interactions, another reality emerges—one rooted in pain, pleasure, interests and emotions of others. I call this moral reality.
Emotional reality belongs to the individual experiencing it; moral reality applies to societies sharing similar pain / pleasure parameters. Neither is as absolute as the physical reality, yet I am term them realities because they feel as profound to us as a spoon, book or table dimensions.
Questions on virtue representation
When we describe a moral matter, we often say “right” or “wrong.” Are we using a spatial model of morality, just as we do for social hierarchies, principles, classifications, and numbers—creating imaginary spaces and shapes to understand realities[9] [10]? To my knowledge, there is no research confirming this, yet linguistically, moral “rightness” often aligns with “right” (as in direction) and correctness (conformity to a standard) in human languages, with exceptions that reveal a human dimension. For instance, “true” in English (from Old English trēowe) ties etymologically to trust (faithful, trustworthy). Have we abandoned our automatic indicators—our direct experiences of pain and pleasure—to replace them with spatial indicators because they are more capable and more prevalent in the brain?
When looking at terms related to morality, we find that the moral domain often borrows from social class, as with “noble” in English and similar terms in many languages, or from what/who is known. However, virtue-specific terms exist across languages. Similarly, “good” often merges with “beautiful.” Are humans overly attached to sight and the spatial domain? Does the reliance on spatial domain pose a bias that prevents us from processing other levels of reality properly? Interestingly, unlike the world most dominant languages, in hunter-gatherer languages, “good” is more frequently linked to what is pleasant, and it often means “proper.” I’m not claiming this is the prevailing pattern in hunter-gatherer languages, but some follow this trend. Does the lifestyle percieve moral reality? Or is “good” a narrow term for this analysis?
If the domain of pain and pleasure fade from our mental representations, language, and processes like empathy and theory of mind, should we alter our language and engage in specific practices or exercises to correct this course?
Though morality isn’t solely emotional, its roots in human societies undeniably lie in emotional experience. Murder, theft, and harm evoke horror—not just due to practical consequences but their emotional impact. Humans also illogically moralize purity, food taboos, and aggression. Should morality shed or embrace this emotional heritage?
References
[1] Hawkins, Jeff. A thousand brains: a new theory of intelligence. Basic Books, 2021.
[2] Mountcastle, Vernon B. “The columnar organization of the neocortex.” Brain: a journal of neurology 120.4 (1997): 701-722.
[3] Dennett, Daniel, and Kathleen Akins. “Multiple drafts model.” Scholarpedia 3.4 (2008): 4321.
[4] Minsky, Marvin. Society of mind. Simon and Schuster, 1988.
[5] Hawkins, Jeff, et al. “A framework for intelligence and cortical function based on grid cells in the neocortex.” Frontiers in neural circuits 12 (2019): 121.
[6] Ong, Wei-Yi, Christian S. Stohler, and Deron R. Herr. “Role of the prefrontal cortex in pain processing.” Molecular neurobiology 56.2 (2019): 1137-1166.
[7] Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Vintage, 2012.
[8] Boccadoro, Sara, et al. “Women with early maltreatment experience show increased resting-state functional connectivity in the theory of mind (ToM) network.” European journal of psychotraumatology 10.1 (2019): 1647044.
[9] Tavares, Rita Morais, et al. “A map for social navigation in the human brain.” Neuron 87.1 (2015): 231-243.
[10] Constantinescu, Alexandra O., Jill X. O’Reilly, and Timothy EJ Behrens. “Organizing conceptual knowledge in humans with a gridlike code.” Science 352.6292 (2016): 1464-1468.